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REVIEWS
The Review Section of E&A consists of three parts. The first is made up of
brief reviews of books and articles (and perhaps films, etc.) that are concerned
in some way with the rights and wrongs of human treatment of non-human ani
mals. The second part of this Section is entitled 'Replies' and contains comments
on or responses to reviews published in earlier issues of E&A. By letter the
Editor invites the authors of works reviewed to respond, and by this proclama
tion in each issue invites all other interested readers to submit comments. The
third part of the Reviews Section is a list of works of which reviews are invited.
Any m.ember who wishes to review any work in this continuing 'Reviews Needed'
list should contact the Editor.

Bryan G. Norton, "Environmental Ethics and Nonhuman Rights,"
Environmental Ethics, Vol. 4, No.1, Spring, 1982, pp. 17-36.
Norton wants to show that envi ron
mentalists "lack a coherent theoretical
rationale around which to rally." As
evidence of this alleged lack, Norton
cites two cases in which environmen
talists failed to achieve thei r goal:
the Tellico dam project on the Ten
nessee River, and the Dickey-Lincoln
hydroelectric project on the St. John
River in Maine.
But why did enVi
ronmentalists fai I to stop these pro
jects? From Norton's own account, it
looks like one reason was that they
could not agree on what sort of ethi
cal appeal to make, and not that they
lacked a coherent eth ical theory.
They couldn't decide whether to make
a utilitarian appeal or to defend the
rights
of
endangered
species.
Besides, they could have had a cohe
rent theoretical
rationale and still
failed to stop the projects in question
because they were up against big
business and greed for profit.
. Why aren't standard ethical theo
ries such as utilitarianism and rights
theory a coherent basis for environ
mental ethics?
Norton argues that
these two approaches are inadequate,
at least as a basis for envi ronmental
eth ics. The fi rst view he discusses is
utilitarianism,
or
more specifically
"anthropocentric utilitarianism."
On

th is view, actions a re good if they
maximize the happiness of the totality
of humans, ignoring nonhuman indi
viduals.
According to Norton, this
view is unsatisfactory as a rationale
for
preserving
the
environment
. because if human preferences are
modified in the appropriate way, then
any given natu ral object or species
could be destroyed.
For example, if
no human had any interest in saving
the
North
American
timber
wolf
because, say, these wolves do not
make good pets, then there would be
nothing wrong with
allowing this
species to become extinct.
No doubt this sort of utilitarianism
is unacceptable; but why not expand
utilitarianism to include nonhuman ani
mals?
Following
Bentham
(and
Singer), we can say that any creature
capable
of
suffering
should
be
included in our utilitarian calculation.
This sort of "sentient utilitarianism"
could
be
used to argue against
destroying the natural habitat of non. human animals, since this would cause
them to suffer.
I n any event, it is
hasty to conclude that utilitarianism
cannot provide an adequate environ
mental ethic just because one version,
"anthropocentric utilitarianism," which
is
not
even
the
most
plausible

E&A IV/l

version, cannot do the job.
Most of Norton's article is con
cerned with a second approach to
envi ronmental
ethics,
namely
the
appeal to the rights of nonhumans.
Unlike some authors, he does not
challenge the attribution of rights to
nonhumans.
This
is
because, he
accepts (with a couple of additions)
Feinberg's account of rights. On this
account, if X is an individual who can
have an interest, then X can have a
right. Not all interests imply rights,
but some do; in particular the interest
in not suffering implies a right not to
suffer.
Rights can be overriden by
other goods and obligations.
But all
individuals who are capable of suffer
ing to a comparable degree must be
considered equally, and this means
that some nonhumans who have an
interest in not suffering have a right
to not suffer.
Norton says that his account gives
only the "minimal conditions" for hav
ing a right.
He does not attempt to
say defi n itely wh ich interests are s uf
ficient for having a right (although he
is willing to grant that the interest in
not suffering implies a right not to
suffer), nor does he say what goods
or obligations cou Id override rights.
This leaves several important ques
tions unanswered, for example, does
the human interest in consuming ani
mal flesh override the right of animals
not to suffer?
Anyway, assuming that nonhuman
animals do have rights, including the
right not to suffer, why doesn't this
imply that we have corresponding
duties to them such as the important
environmental duty to preserve their
natural habitat?
This is the main
issue, and Norton devotes several
pages to attacking the claim that non
human
rights
imply
envi ronmental
duties.
Let us confine our attention
to four of Norton's arguments.
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First, no matter where one draws
the line as to what has interests (and
corresponding
rights),
there
will
always be some area of earth or sea
which is not the habitat for any
rights-holding individual, and which
does not have to be preserved to pre
vent the violation or rights.
One difficulty for this argument,
and indeed for Norton's whole article,
is that he ignores the possibility that
future individuals have rights.
He
accepts. Feinberg's account of rights,
but he ignores Feinberg's contention
that futu re generations can
have
rights. . But if we assume that there
will be rights-holding individuals in
the future, as Feinberg does, and
that they will need places to live,
including presently unoccupied places,
then it seems that we have a duty to
preserve these places for future indi
viduals.
Fu rthermore, even if we
confine our moral consideration to
those presently living, we would still
have a duty to preserve uninhabited
areas as possible habitats for those
living in too-crowded areas or those
who need to roam. The North Ameri
can timber wolf, for example, requires
as much as ten square miles of wil
derness in order to survive. So we
ought to preserve large areas of basi
cally
uninhabited
land
for them,
assuming that we grant that they have
a right to su rvive.
Second, Norton argues that if the
class of rights holders is restricted to
primates, the resulting environmental
ethic will not protect areas which
affect no primates.
But why should
we restrict rights to primates? Aren't
there creatu res capable of suffering
who are not primates?
Moreover,
even restricting our concern just to
primates, it is hard to see what areaS
of land or sea we can safely destroy
or pollute without affecting any pri
mates; presumably human primates will
be affected no matter what area of
land or sea is polluted.
After all,
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destroying or polluting one area of
land or sea affects other areas - an
H-bomb exploded in some remote place
still produces wide-spread radioactiv
radioactivity.
Now suppose we adopt Singer's
view that sentience is where we draw
the line between those we morally
consider and those we don't.
Then
we should preserve the environment to
prevent the suffering of sentient cre
creatures.Norton replies, third, that it
is always possible for humans to pre
prevent the suffering of sentient crea
creatures while at the same time destroy
destroying their natural habitat. The animals
whose
natu ral
habitat
has
been
destroyed could be "moved to zoos or
other preserves, protected from pred
predators, given food and shelter."
Perhaps relocation of animals would
reduce thei r sufferi ng when thei r
habitat has been destroyed, but it
would not eliminate this suffering.
The animals would suffer less if their
natural habitat was not destroyed in
the first place.
Besides, what about
future
generations
of
animals?
Wouldn't they suffer from the loss of
thei r natu ral habitat?
Fourth, Norton mentions a serious
practical difficulty: Should we concern

ourselves with individuals or with
whole species? The animal liberation
liberationist tends to be concerned with indi
individual animals, but the environmental
environmentalist is worried about preserving whole
species, and is not so concerned
about the fate of individual animals.
Thus environmentalists advocate the
culling of deer and buffalo herds in
the absence of natu ral predators.
Leopold, for
instance,
recommends
hunting as an ideal form of human
recreation in the same book in which
he introduces his famous land ethic.
But vegetarians and antivivisectionists
will object that culling deer by hunt
hunting or just random slaughter causes
needless suffering for the animals.
Surely this is not an insurmounta
insurmountable problem. There must be a better
way to control the population of ani
animals than hunting and random killing;
nobody seriously advocates this as a
way of limiting the human population,
so why should we do this to animals?
An alternative would be sterilization.
Environmentalists
can
and
should
agree, at least in principle, that we
ought not to cause unnecessary suf
suffering to sentient individuals, and
they can do this without giving up
their goal of preserving the natural
envi ronment and nonhuman species.
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